The significant fall in the labour force participation of rural women between 2004 and 2011 has been an issue that has generated considerable academic interest. In this paper, we look at thirty years of comparable NSS data from 1983 to 2011 of rural women's participation in the labour force using a variety of definitions of female labour force participation that capture both market and non-market work. We find a long-term slow decline in the participation of rural women in wage work and selfemployment, especially among dalit and adivasi women in poor agricultural labourer households. The more recent sharp decline in female labour force participation (FLP) in 2004-2011 has occurred both in market and non-market work, and across most categories of economically active women. Our analysis highlights the somewhat contradictory behaviour of rural FLP across different definitions and time periods, and across different correlates of female labour force participation, and suggests that more complex factors are at work than has usually been discussed in the literature.
INTRODUCTION
A puzzle about India's economic development path has been the low rate of female labour force participation in spite of several decades of high economic growth. The experience from other countries suggest that the combined effect of economic growth, rising education levels among women, and falling fertility rates leads to increasing participation of women in the labour force. India's rate of economic growth has averaged over 6 per cent since 1991, female literacy rates have increased from 53.7 per cent in 2001 to 64.5 per cent in 2011, and total fertility rate has fallen from 3.71 in 1990 to 2.50 in 2012. In spite of this, female workforce participation rates fell from 33.1 per cent in 1977-78 to 26.1 per cent in 2009-10 for rural females and from 15.6 per cent in 1977-78 to 13.8 per cent in 2009-2010 (using employment in principal and subsidiary status, see Himanshu (2011) ). South Asia's female labour force participation is one of the lowest in the world, but even by South Asia's dismal record in female labour force participation, India's experience in this regard has been abysmal (South Asia's average participation rate for females is 35 per cent, see World Bank (2012) ). Particularly striking has been the decline in the female labour force participation rate from 33.3 per cent in 2004-05 to 26.5 per cent in 2009 -10 (Himanshu 2011 .
A large literature has examined recent trends in rural female labour force participation (RLFPR) in India (Himanshu 2011 , Mazumdar and Neetha 2011 , Hirway 2012 , Neff et al. 2012 , Abraham 2013 , Mehrotra et al. 2014 , Neetha 2014 , Kapsos et al. 2014 , Sanghi et al. 2015 . There seems to be no consensus, however, on what explains the recent decline in RLFPR. One view stresses the role of education, with women in rural areas are now pursuing higher education and are therefore simply not available for the labour force (Chowdhury 2011; Rangarajan et al. 2011) . A second view highlights a possible "income effect". Arguing that household incomes could have risen in rural areas due to higher wage levels which have taken the pressure off women to seek distress employment in times of economic hardship (World Bank 2010; Himanshu 2011; Rangarajan 2011 , Neff et al. 2012 . A third view argues that the decline in women's LFPR is due to an overall decline in or absence of short and long term employment opportunities in rural areas (World Bank 2010; Chowdhury 2011; Mazumdar and Neetha 2011) . A fourth view argues that the decline of rural female LFPR could be due to cultural factors and social constraints which might come to the fore with rising incomes or limited employment opportunities (see Das 2006; Olsen and Mehta 2006; Chowdhury 2011) . It could even be that women's nonwork status is a growing source of household dignity or honour (Olsen and Mehta, 2007) but the evidence does not cast light directly on that.
In this paper, we contribute to the literature on the recent decline in rural female labour force participation in two ways. Firstly, we suggest that how you define women's work matters in understanding the evolution of RLFPR over time, and argue that we need to work with different definitions of female labour force participation that can capture both paid and unpaid work to understand patterns and trends in RLFPR. Secondly, we take a long-run view of RLFPR, over three decades, to understand whether there are long-run forces at work, or whether changes in the RLFPR can be explained by more contemporaneous events. To do this, we create comparable definitions of RLFPR and its determinants over the NSS rounds of 1983-84, 1993-94, 2004-05 and 2011-12 . The definitions of RLFPR we construct are: a) participation in only wage employment (narrow definition); b: participation in wage employment and self-employment, and women looking for work (medium definition) and c) participation in paid work (wage work and self-employment) and unpaid workthat is, unpaid helpers and women involved in extra-domestic duties (wide definition). We than examine the patterns in RLFPR across these three definitions and its correlates over the period 1983-2011. i Our main findings are as follows: a) the behaviour of RLFPR using the medium definition shows a long-term decline that predates the 2000s. We do not observe a similar long-term decline using the narrow and wide definitions, suggesting that the determinants of declining self-employment for rural women may not be the same as that for wage work and non-market work; b) we see a longterm decline in the labour force participation of Dalit and Adivasi women that suggests that more secular factors are at work to explaining their increasing withdrawal from the labour force; c) we see a clear decline in RLFPR using the narrow and wide definitions in 2004-2011, especially among unmarried women in landless and the poorest households, across all social groups; d) at the other end of the spectrum, we see a fall in RLFPR among more educated women, and e) we see no clear substitution for non-market work from market work over time, indicating that the lack of employment opportunities for women cannot be seen as the main driver of declining RLFPR.
The rest of the paper is organised in four sections. Section II discusses the conceptual basis of measuring women's work and the implications this has for measuring RLFPR. Section III provides a brief discussion of the correlates of RLFPR, as a prelude to the empirical analysis. Section IV examines the NSS data and provides an analysis of patterns and trends in RLFPR over 1983-2011. Section V concludes.
II.

MEASUREMENT CATEGORIES FOR LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION
Alternative definitions of labour force participation matter for development both in themselves, as indicators of women's roles in the economy, and also because they lead toward a better understanding of possible segmentation of labour markets and the interweaving of informality, domestic work, and what is termed here as 'extra-domestic work' -that which creates commodities or provides services otherwise also produced in the economy, but on a subsistence basis or using home-based production methods. In this section we set out the way female labour force participation is measured, which is innovative (following Rodgers, 2012) . We first discuss the data that we use in the paper.
Data
We use the employment and unemployment data collected by the Indian National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) for the years 1983, 1993, 2004-2005 and 2011-2012, corresponding to the 38 th , 50th, 61 st and 68 th rounds. The NSSO undertakes "thick" rounds (where a large and nationally representative survey is undertaken of the on socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of individuals in India) approximately every five years; as we are interested in long-term trends and patterns, we use one NSS round per decade, with the period between two consecutive rounds in our analysis being approximately ten years. While there may be short-term factors to do with climactic or other shocks that may influence female labour force participation in any given round of the NSSO, we are interested in the long-term changes in RLFPR that are captured by the decadal changes in female labour force participation and its correlates in rural areas.
The Categorisation of Labour Force Participation
When analysing Indian households, the labour market part of the puzzle can be seen in one of two ways: either people offer their 'supply of labour' independently of the demand for labour (we'll call this the modernization approach), or the supply and demand for labour are partly overlapping due to farming and the informal parts of the labour market. The latter could be called the peasant economics approach (Ellis, 1993) . Even in the modernization approach, once gender issues are introduced, the moral economy of work decisions is complex, because each person's supply of labour can contribute to household income and thus reduce the need for others to work outside the house (Rodgers, 2012) . Ellis showed that when intrahousehold work is valued, as in farming and micro-enterprises, the substitution effects have an important part in each individual's apparent supply of labour outcome. Even in Ellis' models, the total supply of labour must be seen to include both unremunerated farming labour and small enterprises, as well as working outside the house. The farm or the shop or trading activity can use 'unpaid helpers' or informally arranged coentrepreneurship, and thus take up labour time, creating a demand for labour simultaneously with making decisions to supply this latter. This more complex approach is superior to making false assumptions that the economy is fully modernised. The modernised approach would separate the breadwinner (who is in the labour market) from the demand for labour, and the rest of the family (who are construed as non-earners) from the supply of labour. Overall, the peasant economics approach is preferable.
Using such a conceptual framework to measure labour time, we can define narrow labour as the supply of labour onto markets where the demander is outside one's own household (which is not exactly the definition used by Rodgers, 2012) . Our narrowest definition (LFP1) includes casual paid daily labour ("kuulie") and salaried employment. At the other extreme, as 'wide' we are able to define labour most widely to include informal sector work, unpaid family helpers, farming work, and extradomestic work (defined below), using the label LFP3 for wide labour. In between, LFP2 is familiar to western labour specialists, because it includes self-employment of the respondent. Ambiguities around the definition of self-employment have made this category under-report women's remunerated market-related work.
ii Table 2 shows an even more finely-grained breakdown. See also Figure 1 in which the three main definitions are depicted as concentric circles for 2011/12. Within the narrow categorisation, which includes employees and salaried workers, casual labour, and labour done under the national employment guarantee scheme (Figure 1 , first circle), the salaried part can be discerned in Table 1 Some controversies must be attacked head-on. First, a person having a subsidiary occupation but no principle occupation is included as active according to their subsidiary work. The subsidiary work is counted here even if it takes up less than six months of their year. The NSS EUS used a one-year recall in all the Rounds from 1983. The minimum standard we use to count work into all our definitions is at least one hour of work, following the ILO definitions of work. Thus the work recorded here is consistent with ILO's approach.
Secondly, a person's work could be misrepresented by their household's main respondent. The reports given by a household head, or whoever else might respond on behalf of the whole household, may involve some subjective approximation of what roles take up their time. This approximation may use typical category labels, like 'housewife'. That is why we need the 'wide' definition so badly. On the other hand it also implies an admitted weakness in the accuracy and comparability of the household NSS EUS records. iv Thirdly, the work recorded under our 'wide' measure may significantly understate the actual work done. Extra-domestic work refers to that work done outside all the existing remunerated categories, yet still done in such a way that either subsistence or saleable goods are obtained. These goods include services like teaching (tutoring) and sewing, but we have left out child care. Extradomestic work is not meant to include all the socially reproductive activities. It responds to what is known in lay terms as 'work'. We have made a concession in not recording time spent on cooking, building houses, sweeping, child care and so on, which are also work. There is low status accorded to child care and cooking, as well as cleaning, in Indian homes. However, using this NSS data we cannot highlight this work as there is no record of it. Even so, a huge amount of work emerges under the wide heading and we hope to offer some insights by using this new headcount of 'wide' workers. It includes effectively housewives who also did work outside the home, not for direct remuneration.
In between narrow and wide, we define LFP2 as a medium measure of work participation.
v LFP2 is not meant as the perfect or ideal measure. It is meant to capture a halfway point between the two useful extremes of measurement. LFP2 omits the extradomestic work which some would call subsistence labour. One reason is that extradomestic work was defined by NSS to arbitrarily include many activities undertaken by women and children, but the NSS ignored the reproductive work done by men, such as collecting firewood, boiling sugar, building houses or walls, cooking, or child care, because men were considered breadwinners a priori. Only women without a principle occupation were invited to state which of ten extradomestic tasks they had engaged in (see Table 1 and Figure  2 ). The recall period was a year. The coverage was patchy. Questions were answered yes/no, not in terms of days worked. In LFP2, the medium measure of work, we include farming work and all other self-employment, if declared as self-employment, but we omit unpaid family helpers. 
Combined)
Source: NSS EUS Survey data, 2011/2. Authors' own calculations, including principal and subsidiary occupational status, as explained in the paper. Adults age 16-64. Table 2 illustrates the finer grained division of workers into the six narrowest and widest categories, and shows the proportions lying in each group for rural women only. One reason why LFP1 includes casual work is that the amount of salaried work for rural women is so small (2% of women in 2011/2012). 
III. Determinants of Female Labour Force Participation in Rural India
In this section, we briefly discuss the literature on the determinants of RLFPR in India. In a standard model of labour supply, an increase in the wage rate of women workers could lead to an increase in their supply of labour, due to the substitution of work for leisure (Klasen and Pieters 2012) . However, an increase in wages could also lead to an income effect where women may decrease labour supply with increase in household incomes as their wages increase. An increase in non-labour household income could also have a similar negative effect on female labour supply. A number of authors have pointed to the existence of an income effect on women's LFP. Olsen and Mehta (2006) for example find that economic poverty made female labour force participation more likely. Similarly, Srivastava and Srivastava (2010, see also Himanshu 2011: p. 47) argue that the female LPR increases in times of distress, i.e. when there is a "perceived fall in the reservation income of the household", ie the level below which they work and above which the woman will be inactive. Rangarajan et al. (2011: p. 70) assume that this might be either because agriculture has become drought resilient, the MGNREGA scheme has managed to provide supplementary jobs, or the real wages have gone up. The income effect can hence also work the other way: With higher incomes when households escape poverty there could be a tendency of women to withdraw from the labour force to attend domestic duties (Rangarajan et al. 2011 ). In India this latter effect can be enhanced through sanskritisation: the process by which low income households emulate high-income Hindu lifestyles (Olsen & Mehta 2007) .
Educational levels of women are also considered to be an important determinant of female labour force participation. A well-known hypothesis in the literature on female labour force participation is the feminisation U-curve hypothesis -in the early stages of development, male educational levels rise faster than female educational levels, so women's wages and opportunities for work change relatively slowly while unearned income rises faster. Participation is further reduced by social stigma associated with women working outside of the home. Later on, as women's education rises as well, and there is an erosion of the social stigma associated with women working, female labour force participation increases. This leads to a U curve in female labour force participation rate over time. (Goldin 1994 (Goldin , 2012 ) Education has been proposed as one of the explanations for the decline in the rural female LFPR. It is assumed that more women in rural areas are now pursuing higher education and are therefore not available for work (see Himanshu 2011 , Rangarajan et al. 2011 ). Chowdhury (2011) however questions this explanation and puts forward the arguments that the overall employment situation for women has not improved and that the rural female LFP has declined for all ages above the age of 15 and not only for those in the age group of 15-24. Further, Kingdon and Unni (2004) find that women's education has an U shaped relationship with wage work participation and that only schooling beyond the junior/middle level enhances their wage work participation.
Changes in the RLFPR can also be explained by the structure of the rural economy (Harriss-White 2003). Due to the stronger competition with men, with a rising population, women might have even less employment opportunities and might be forced out or drop out of the labour force altogether (Thomas 2012) . Moreover supply side factors such as social factors disadvantaging certain social groups (such as women or lower caste groups) in the labour market might be at work. Work tasks for example are traditionally assigned along gender lines. In agriculture women undertake most tasks except ploughing which traditionally has remained a male domain. If a task is performed by women, then it is perceived as socially less valuable (Banerjee 1995) , which has an effect on the wage levels. Women are paid much lower wages compared to men and are often forced to work as unpaid family workers. Mazumdar and Neetha (2011) argue that the period of deindustrialisation between 1999 and 2005 led to the decline of non-agricultural employment opportunities of women. Finally, a number of authors have pointed out that there are cultural and social barriers which prevent women from entering and remaining in the labour force. India is a dominantly patriarchal society where the existing gender roles and norms where it is honourable for women to confine themselves to the reproductive role and to household duties (see Olsen and Mehta 2007) . It could hence be argued that income alone is not sufficient in explaining the decline in rural women's LFP, but income in conjunction with social /cultural norms. The argument is that certain cultural factors and social constraints might come to the fore with rising incomes (Das 2006; Olsen and Mehta 2006; Chowdhury 2011 Neetha 2014 . We investigate the role of each of these factors in explaining patterns of RLPFPR using narrow, medium and wide definitions of female labour force participation in the next section.
IV. Patterns and Trends in Rural Female Labour Force Participation Over Time
We now examine patterns in RLFPR using the narrow, medium and wide definitions, and for various correlates of the female labour force participation, for the NSS rounds of 1983, 1993/94, 2004/05 and 2011/12 . We also present the share of women in the labour force each category considered for 1983 and 2011, to provide magnitudes of the importance of these categories in overall RLFPR. Table 4 shows that the shrinkage of women in the labour force is relatively steep for women in the premarital stage of their life course, across all three definitions of RLFPR. However, there is a large decline in RLFPR for currently married women (who form the bulk of women in the economically active age group) from 2004 to 2011 for the narrow and medium definitions of LFP, less so for the wide definition. Interestingly, the RLFPR of widowed women has increased from 32.8 per cent in 1983 to 35.1 per cent in 2011. 
Marital Status
Social Group
The labour force participation of ST and SC women are higher than that of women in non ST/SC households (Table 5 ). However, we observe that there has a long-term decline in RLFPR for ST and SC women over 1983-2011 , for all definitions of labour force participation. For non SC-ST women, the decline across the three definitions is mostly observed in 2004-2011. Since ST and SC households are among the poorest among rural households, the long-term decline in their labour force participation is surprising, and suggests that non-income factors may be at work in explaining this decline, possibly related to a preference of rural Dalit and Adivasi young women not to do hard menial labour under exploitative conditions, with increasing empowerment and education of such women.
. Ethnographic and village studies also confirm this finding, with evidence of long-term withdrawal of dalit women from agricultural work. As Still (2011) notes, based on ethnographic fieldwork in Andhra Pradesh, "Dalits see women's withdrawal from work and seclusion as progress, colloquially, escaping a life of 'hard work in the sun'" (p. 1145). Similarly, Heyer (2015) finds a similar phenomenon in Tamil Nadu, suggesting that dalit women's decreased participation in paid employment has been made possible by a substantial rise in the earnings of men and an increase In state welfare interventions. Source: our estimates, using NSS data, weighted.
Religion
There are large differences in labour force participation of rural women by religion, with Hindu and Christian women more likely to be in the labour force than Muslim women (Table 6 ). However, we see that much of the decline in labour force participation in 2004-2011 has happened among Hindu and Christian women, as well as with women from other religions (not Hindu-Muslim-Christian). We do not observe a similar decline among Muslim women. We also observe that by 2011, there is a narrowing of the difference in participation rates of women from Hindu and Christian women on one hand and Muslim women on the other, when we consider the wide definition of labour force participation. This suggests that while Muslim women do not take part as much as women of other religions in market work, there is little difference between Muslim women and women of other religions in participation in non-market work (that is, work as unpaid helpers or extra-domestic work). Source: our estimates, using NSS data, weighted.
Education
As observed in previous studies, we see a clear U shaped relationship between educational level and RLFPR. More importantly from our point of view, we see that that largest decline in labour force participation in 2004-2011 has occurred among illiterate women and women educated at secondary schooling level and above. There is less evidence of a decline in RLFPR among women educated at "intermediate" levels. We also observe that if we use the wide definition of labour force participation, the decline in 2004-2011 among illiterate women is less sharp than for women educated at secondary schooling and above. 
Poverty
We find that women in households at the bottom quartile of the monthly per capita expenditure (MPCE) distribution are more likely to work than women in richer households for all three definitions of labour force participation (Table 8) . As before, we see a long-term decline in labour force participation of women across all four quartiles of the MPCE definition for the medium definition. For the narrow and wide definition, the fall in RLFPR occurred mostly in 2004-2011, and this is most pronounced for women in the poorest households. 
Number of Children in Household
Caring for young children is seen as an important reason why women do not participate in the labour force. While women in households with more than two male and two make children are less likely to work than those in households with one or less male and female child, we do not see any significant difference in the rate of decline of labour force participation of women in households with no children as compared to households with one or more child (female or male). Nor do we see any observable differences in rates of change in labour force participation among women in households with and without children for all three definitions of labour force participation (Tables 9  and 10 ). 
Household Occupational Type
Female labour force participation is the highest among wage labour households, whether agricultural or non-agricultural labour (Table 11) . We see the largest drop in RLFPR among these households for 2004-2011 for all definitions of labour force participation. On the other hand, we see a slight increase in the RLFPR of households in the Others category, which are the richest households in the rural sector (Gang et al. 2008) . The drop in LFP1 among agricultural labourer households in 2004-2011 may seem surprising, given that the NREGA was initiated in 2006, with a large proportion of those participating in the program being women from agricultural labourer households. However, the days worked by households in NREGA projects have been historically been low in many states, and often less than 30 days (Desai et al. 2015) . This would imply that NREGA work is not being counted as a subsidiary activity for most agricultural labourer households, which would explain why participation rates of women from agricultural labourer households fell in casual wage work in 2004-2011, even with NREGA work being available. Source: our estimates, using NSS data, weighed.
Differences in RLFPR across States
Finally, we examine whether there are clear regional differences in RLFPR (Table 12 ). We find that there is no clear regional pattern emerging -while there has been a decline in RLFPR using the medium and wide definitions for most states in 2004-2011, the rate of decline does not differ by region. This suggests that there are no regional factors at work in explaining the decline in RLFPR using the narrow and wide definitions in 2004-2011 and using the medium definition over the entire period. It is more likely that all India factors are at work to explain the decline. 
V. CONCLUSIONS
The labour force participation of rural women in India has been historically low, in comparison to other developing countries. The already low rate of rural female labour force participation took a turn for the worse in [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] . In this paper, we attempt to understand the long-term evolution of labour force participation of rural women in India, using thirty years of comparable NSS data from 1983 to 2011 and a variety of definitions of female labour force participation that capture both market and non-market work of women. We find that the sharp drop in female labour force participation (FLP) in 2004-2011 occurs in both narrow and wide definitions of FLP, but that there is a long-term decline in FLP of rural women using the medium definition that takes into account market work (wage work and self-employed) but not non-market work (extra-domestic work and unpaid helpers). We observe that the largest decline over the long term occurs among illiterate unmarried women in poor labourer households, and especially among dalit and adivasi women. We do not find any geographic concentration of the decline in FLP, suggesting that all-India factors rather than regional factors are at work in explaining the decline. We also do not see any observable differences in the rate of decline among women with and without children, suggesting that caring responsibilities is not an important cause of women's withdrawal from the labour force. We see no clear substitution for non-market work from market work over time, indicating that the lack of employment opportunities for women cannot be seen as the main driver of declining RLFPR. Our analysis highlights the somewhat contradictory behaviour of FLP across different definitions and time periods, and across different correlates of female labour force participation, and suggests that more complex factors are at work than has usually been discussed in the literature.
